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Co-Movement in Sticky Price Models with Durable Goods 
By Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst 
 
In an interesting paper Barsky, House, and Kimball (2005) demonstrate that in a standard sticky 
price model a monetary contraction will lead to a decline in nondurable goods production but an 
increase in durable goods production, so that aggregate output is little changed. This lack of co-
movement between nondurables and durables is wildly at odds with the data and occurs because, 
by assumption, durable goods prices are relatively more flexible than nondurable goods prices. 
We investigate possible solutions to this puzzle: nominal wage stickiness and credit constraints. 
We demonstrate that by adding adjustment costs as in Topel-Rosen, the sticky wage model solves 
the co-movement puzzle and delivers reasonable volatilities.   
 
Keywords: Monetary transmission, durable goods, sticky prices, co-movement puzzle 
JEL code: E31, E52 1. Introduction. 
  Recent work on the monetary transmission mechanism has emphasized some of 
the unique characteristics of durable consumption goods (including residential housing) 
in the monetary business cycle.  Using a VAR approach, Erceg and Levin (2005) 
document the high degree of interest-sensitivity of the durable goods sector, eg., an 
exogenous increase in the interest rate leads to an estimated decline in durable goods 
investment of nearly five-times that of the decline in the remaining components of GDP.  
For residential housing investment the decline is nearly ten-times the size of non-durable 
consumption. This heightened interest sensitivity is likely a result of the fact that the 
stock of durables is large relative to the annual durable investment flow.   
Erceg and Levin (2005) construct a two-sector general equilibrium model in 
which the durable and non-durable sectors are subject to price stickiness.  They calibrate 
the model to match the sectoral responses to a monetary shock.  They assume an equal 
degree of price stickiness across the two sectors.  This assumption seems quite heroic, 
and there are reasons to think that the prices of durable goods are much more flexible 
than are non-durable goods.  For example, housing prices are surely not set in advance, 
and Bils and Klenow (2004) report much greater frequency of price adjustment for 
consumer durables.   
Using a general equilibrium model quite similar to Erceg and Levin (2005), 
Barsky et al. (2005) demonstrate that the behavior of aggregate output in the model in 
response to a one-time change in the money supply is largely determined by the relative 
degree of price stickiness in the durable goods sector.  In particular, if durable goods 
prices are flexible, but non-durable goods prices are sticky, then a monetary contraction 
  1will lead to a decline in non-durable goods production but an increase in durable goods 
production, so that aggregate output is little changed.  This lack of co-movement between 
non-durables and durables is wildly at odds with the data.  We call this the “co-movement 
puzzle.”  The source of the puzzle is clear.  If the only shock to the system is a monetary 
shock, then this shock will directly affect only the sector with sticky nominal prices (the 
non-durable sector). The other sector (durable goods) is only affected indirectly as the 
decline in demand for inputs in the non-durable sector leads to a decline in production 
costs for durable goods and thus an expansion of durable goods production.   
This paper begins with the premise that durable goods prices are much more 
flexible than are non-durable goods prices. We interpret durable goods to be residential 
housing. It seems unlikely that there is much, if any, nominal price stickiness in housing. 
We therefore assume that durable goods prices are perfectly flexible. We assume that 
monetary policy is conducted by a Taylor-type interest rate operating procedure. This is 
in contrast to Barksy et al (2005) who assume that monetary policy is given by a random 
walk of the money supply. We first demonstrate that the co-movement puzzle arises 
under this alternative monetary operating procedure: an exogenous increase in the interest 
rate leads to a modest decline in the non-durable sector, a large expansion in the durable 
goods sector, and a near-zero response in aggregate activity.   
Our sensitivity analysis includes an investigation of two key parameters.  First, 
higher levels of complementarity between non-durables and durables will make co-
movement more likely.  However, the results below indicate that we need an implausibly 
high degree of complementarity (close to Leontief preferences) before co-movement 
arises. As a second form of sensitivity analysis, we follow Topel and Rosen’s (1988) 
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construction. Using Topel and Rosen’s (1988) estimate of the short-run elasticity of 
supply, we find that aggregate activity in the model does sharply decline in response to an 
increase in the interest rate but the co-movement puzzle remains. 
Barsky et al (2003) suggest two possible solutions to the puzzle: nominal wage 
stickiness, and credit constraints. The former is a “supply” story.  With nominal wage 
stickiness a monetary contraction will tend to increase real wages, leading to a reduction 
in desired output by the durable goods firms. The credit constraint is a “demand” story.  
If a monetary contraction makes it more difficult for consumers to purchase durable 
goods, then the resulting decline in labor demand will tend to decrease real wages.   
Similarly, the demand nature of the credit story implies that the relative price of durables 
will fall more sharply in response to a monetary contraction than in the sticky wage 
model.  We will investigate both a sticky-wage model and a credit model below. 
Nominal wage stickiness is added to the model in a manner similar to Erceg, 
Henderson and Levin (2000).  Since labor is the key input in production, nominal wage 
stickiness induces a great deal of nominal stickiness in the durable good price.  For 
plausible degrees of wage stickiness, and no adjustment costs, we find excessive 
volatility in the first quarter and negative co-movement in subsequent quarters (Barsky et 
al (2003) report similar results.)  However, we demonstrate that by adding adjustment 
costs as in Topel-Rosen (1988), the sticky wage model solves the co-movement puzzle 
and delivers reasonable volatilities.   
We also investigate the role of credit constraints.  A traditional argument for the 
increased sensitivity of housing to the business cycle is that housing and durable goods 
  3purchases are subject to credit constraints that are not applicable to non-durable goods.  
We modify the basic model to incorporate a credit constraint that applies only to durable 
goods purchases. In contrast to the recent literature, we examine a “flow constraint” in 
that current durable goods purchases are constrained by the household’s current labor 
income.
1  This constraint is motivated by a classic hold-up problem. We show that credit 
constraints can also solve the hold-up problem.  However, the behavior of the real wage 
in this model appears to be counterfactual. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the baseline sticky-price model 
with durable goods and documents the co-movement puzzle in the model.  Section 3 
investigates the sticky wage model.  Section 4 introduces the credit constraint and 
demonstrates the ability of this credit-constraint model to generate co-movement.  
Section 5 concludes and discusses whether the sticky wage solution or the credit 
constraint solution best matches the data. 
 
 
2. A Benchmark Durable Goods Model. 
 
  The economy consists of numerous households and firms each of which we will 
discuss in turn.  
 
2.a. Households. 
                                                 
1 Iacoviello (2005) analyzes a model with borrowing constraints in which the stock of  debt is constrained 
by the stock of housing. 
  4Households are identical and infinitely-lived with preferences over consumption (Ct), 




























































where V is concave.  The parameter ρ >0 is the elasticity of substitution between durable 
and non-durable consumption, b > 0, σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
and ω > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity.  Since money balances are 
separable and we are using an interest rate operating procedure, the form of V is 
irrelevant in what follows.  The household’s resource constraints include: 
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where  denotes the purchase of new housing, δ is the depreciation rate of housing, 





t P t is 
the nominal wage,  t π  denotes the profits flow from firms, and   is the endogenous 
lump-sum monetary transfer needed to meet the interest rate target. The first order 
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As for production, there are two sectors, housing and non-durables.  Since the two 
sectors are entirely symmetric we will focus on a generic production sector.  Within each 
sector there is a layer of perfectly competitive final goods firms.  Final goods production 
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where   denotes the final good, and   denotes the continuum of intermediate goods, 
each indexed by i ∈ [0,1].  The implied demand for the intermediate good is thus given 
by    

















    
where is the dollar price of good i, and  is the final goods price.   Perfect 
competition in the final goods market implies that the final goods price is given by  
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  6Intermediate goods firm i is a monopolist producer of intermediate good i.  Each 
intermediate firm hires labor from households utilizing the linear production function 
where we have dropped the firm-specific subscript for simplicity.  We 
assume that labor may freely flow across firms and sectors so that there is a common 
nominal wage.  Imperfect competition implies that factor payments are distorted.  In 
particular, we have 
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where   denotes the real marginal cost of production in sector j (durables or non-
durables).  Since factor markets are competitive, the intermediate goods firms take  as 




As for intermediate goods pricing, we follow Yun (1997) and utilize the 
assumption of Calvo staggered pricing.  Each period fraction (1-ν) of firms get to set a 
new price, while the remaining fraction ν must charge the previous period’s price times 
steady-state inflation (denoted by π).  This probability of a price change is constant 
across time and is independent of how long it has been since any one firm has last 
adjusted its price.  Suppose that firm i wins the Calvo lottery and can set a new price in 
time t.  It’s optimization problem is given by (we again have omitted the sectoral 
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where  denotes the marginal utility of a dollar.  The optimization 
condition is given by 




































       
If ν = 0 so that all prices are flexible each period, Zt = (η-1)/η < 1.  This latter term Z ≡ 
(η-1)/η is a measure of the steady-state distortion arising from monopolistic competition.  
In the case of sticky prices (ν > 0), Zt will typically not equal Z  and will reflect the time-
varying monopoly distortion.   
We will assume that prices are perfectly flexible in the housing sector (νx = 0).  
Following Topel and Rosen (1988), we assume that there are firm-level adjustment costs 
in the housing industry, and that these costs are linked to the change in the level of 
production.  In particular, the typical housing construction firm faces the following 
maximization problem: 
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where we assume g(0) = g’(0) = 0, and g”(0) = φ > 0.  This implies that the firm’s short-
run production elasticity is given by 
















Below we will consider the sensitivity of the model to the presence of this adjustment 
cost.   
 
2.c. Calibration. 
  8  We choose preference and production parameters consistent with empirical 
evidence and other studies. In their study of durable goods, Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) 
estimate σ = 2, and ρ = 1.17.  We calibrate the model to residential housing, thus 
suggesting a lower value of ρ. We use ρ = 1.0.  The Frisch labor supply elasticity is set to 
1 (ω = 1), and φ is chosen to imply a steady-state level of employment of 1/3.  The 
preference parameter b is chosen to imply a steady-state with 82% non-durable 
consumption.  Finally, β = .995 (quarterly) implies a 2% annual real interest rate, and δ = 
2.5% is the annual durable deprecation rate.   
  As for firms, we assume a steady-state mark-up of 10% for both types of firms 
(Z = .9).  We assume that durable goods firms have perfectly flexible prices (νx = 0), 
while non-durable goods prices are adjusted (on average) every three quarters (νc = .67).  
The log-linearized Calvo price-adjustment equation is given by  
1 + + = t t t t E z π β λ π .   
Our calibration of non-durable price adjustment implies λ
c = 0.1715.   
In terms of production adjustment costs in the housing sector, our benchmark 
calibration assumes zero adjustment costs so that the short-run production elasticity is 
infinite (ES = ∞, φ = 0). Using housing data, Topel and Rosen (1988) estimate a short run 
production elasticity of unity (ES = 1.0, φ = 1.1), so we also report results for this 
elasticity. 
  To close the model we need to specify the central bank reaction function.  In what 
follows we assume a reaction function where the current nominal interest rate is a 
function of inflation and the lagged interest rate.  In log deviations, this rule is given by:   
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To develop some intuition for what follows, consider the simplest environment in 
which the utility functional is separable between housing and non-durables.  Since 
housing durables are a stock with a relatively small depreciation rate,  will vary 
little in response to shocks. Define 








t ≡ Δ .  From (2) this implies that Δt responds 
very little to shocks.  The labor supply equation (1) can be rewritten using this term as 













Since durable goods have flexible prices, the real wage in terms of durables is 
constant.  Hence,   does not vary much with shocks, that is, labor and thus production 
does not vary with monetary shocks.  
L U














t ≡ Δ varies 
little with shocks, this implies that nondurable consumption must fall with a monetary 
contraction. Since output is nearly constant this implies that a monetary contraction will 
increase the production of durables.   
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does not vary much with shocks, 
that is, movements in the nominal rate are met with comparable movements in the 
inflation rate in durables.  In particular, an increase in the nominal rate leads to a 
comparable increase in the expected price inflation of the durable good.  The rational 
household chooses to purchase durables contemporaneously, before the durable price 
inflation.   
Figure 1 exhibits the model economy’s behavior to a policy shock that causes the 
nominal interest rate to increase by 25 basis points (100 annual basis points).  The model 
is labeled “Baseline.”  The endogeneity of the policy rule implies that the needed policy 
innovation is larger than this,  = 0.47.  Price stickiness in the non-durable sector leads 
to a sharp decline in non-durable production (-0.72).  This implies a decline in demand 
for labor, and thus a decline in nominal marginal cost for the durable goods industry.  
These lower production costs lead to a sharp fall in the relative price of durable goods 
prices and a sharp increase in durable goods production. Durable good investment 
increases by 3.3%. Total employment and total production are essentially unchanged, 
with employment falling by only 0.007%.  All of these effects are protracted because of 
the persistence in the interest rate change.   
R
t ε
These sectoral implications are wildly at odds with the empirical evidence of co-
movement across the durable and non-durable sectors, with the durable sector production 
falling by much more than non-durable production. We have conducted extensive 
  11sensitivity analysis.  A key parameter is the degree of substitutability between non-
durables and durables.  For smaller values of ρ the two goods are complementary so that 
they are more likely to move together even with differing degrees of price rigidity.  
Figure 1 considers the extreme case of ρ = 0.1 (ρ = 0 is Leontief preferences).  Note that 
even in this case we do not get co-movement.  In fact, it takes a ridiculously low value of 
ρ = 0.029 (!) before durable purchases actually fall with an increase in interest rates.    
Finally, Figure 1 considers the case with adjustment costs in the durable goods 
sector calibrated to ES = 1.  The adjustment costs greatly dampens the increase in durable 
good production.  Because of this, employment now decreases on impact instead of being 
essentially constant as in the baseline case.  However, the co-movement puzzle remains. 
 
3. Adding sticky nominal wages. 
One interpretation of the co-movement puzzle is that the relative price of housing 
falls too sharply in the wake of a monetary contraction.  One way of solving the puzzle is 
to add elements to the model that moderate this relative price movement.  Since durable 
prices are assumed to be flexible, they are constant mark-ups over nominal wages.  
Hence, if we assume that nominal wages are sticky, then durable prices will inherit this 
stickiness.  There is no reason to suppose that wage stickiness differs across durable vs. 
non-durable firms.  We therefore consider the case of symmetric nominal wage rigidity. 
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that households are 
monopolistic suppliers of labor and that firms employ a CES aggregator of household 
  12labor with an elasticity of substitution equal to θw > 1.  In particular, the labor aggregator 
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The variable Zht is the monopoly distortion as it measures how far the household’s 
marginal rate of substitution is from the real wage. In the case of perfectly flexible but 
monopolistic wages, Zht = Zh is constant and less than unity. The smaller is Zh, the 
greater is the monopoly power. In the case of sticky nominal wages, Zht is variable and 
moves in response to the real and nominal shocks hitting the economy. These fluctuations 
will necessarily imply fluctuations in employment.  Erceg et al. (2000) demonstrate that 
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  13where  is time-t net nominal wage growth,   denotes the log deviation from steady-
state, and 
W
t π t zh
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≡ , with  w ν denoting the fraction of households that 
cannot adjust their nominal wages in the current quarter.
2   
Figure 2 presents the results.  We set  w θ  = 11, implying a 10% labor supply 
distortion in the steady-state.  We consider two different cases of  w ν ,  w ν  = 4% (96% of 
wages can be adjusted each period) and  w ν  = 15% (85% of wages can be adjusted each 
period).   The reason for these small degrees of nominal stickiness are apparent in Figure 
2.  Although in either case the model generates co-movement in the initial period, the size 
of the durable response becomes very large, very quickly as we increase  w ν . For 
example, if we imposed common stickiness across non-durables and wages (νw = 0.67), 
the response of durables to a monetary shock is more than 1000 times larger than the 
response of non-durables!  Note also that the assumption of sticky wages leads to rapid 
over-shooting of durable spending, ie., durable investment moves above normal after 
only one period.
3
Figure 3 presents the case with nominal wage stickiness and adjustment costs in 
durable production set to ES = 1.  With adjustment costs the response of durables is 
greatly diminished so we report results with wage stickiness of the same order of 
magnitude as non-durable stickiness (νc =  νw = 0.67).  The adjustment costs smooth 
production over time so that durable production falls, and continues to fall for a sustained 
                                                 
2 See page 224 of Woodford (2003) for details.   
3 We also considered the case of sticky durable goods prices.  The results in this case are almost identical to 
the case of sticky nominal wages.  However, for the case of residential housing we find the assumption of 
sticky prices implausible. 
  14period of time (durable production reaches its trough one year after the monetary shock).  
The decline in production implies a decline in labor income so that non-durable 
consumption falls more sharply than in the baseline case.   
 
 
4. A Durable Goods Model with Credit 
Constraints. 
 
Because of the size of the transaction, durable good purchases are inherently 
linked to credit markets.  To the extent that future labor income is illiquid, current 
durable good purchases are likely to be constrained by current income.  This is the basic 
logic of the credit constraint that we consider.  In particular, we assume that durable good 
investment is constrained by some portion of current labor income.  An example of such 
a constraint is the familiar rule-of-thumb that the total amount that a household can spend 
on housing should not exceed 28% of their income.  
An alternative way of thinking about such a constraint is that there is a hold-up 
problem in the durable goods market.  Suppose that each period the representative 
household must re-purchase its entire stock of durables.  This is of course an extreme 
assumption, but it magnifies the effect of the credit constraint. The household makes this 
durable purchase before receiving its labor income. At the end of the period, the durable 
good firm can ex post seize a fraction (μ < 1) of the household’s labor income along with 
the un-depreciated value of the durable stock. Because of this inability to seize all 
income, the household can always ex-post re-negotiate the durable good’s selling price to 
the detriment of the firm.  To entirely avoid this hold-up problem, the firm simply limits 
  15the purchases of the household so that the household has no incentive to re-negotiate.  In 
particular we have: 
1 ) 1 ( − − + ≤ t
x
t t t t
x
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We call (5) the “hold-up” constraint.  Note that (5) is a flow constraint: current durable 
investment is constrained by the current flow of income.   
There are other motivations for a constraint like (5).  For example, suppose again 
that the purchase of the durable good occurs before current labor income is earned.  After 
the transaction the firm and household separate, with the firm anticipating full payment 
for the durable by the end of the period.  If the household does not repay, the firm can 
seize the household’s durable stock, and find the household with probability μ.  In this 
case, the firm can seize all of the household’s labor income, but there is a fixed 
bankruptcy cost (F > 0) of seizing household income expressed in terms of time.  In this 
case we have the constraint: 
) ( F W L W X P t t t t
x
t − ≤ μ       (6) 
The risk averse household will want to avoid the uncertainty of losing all of their current 
income so that the existence of (6) implies that bankruptcy will not be observed in 
equilibrium.  
We will use version (6) of the hold-up constraint in what follows.  The fixed cost 
has an intuitive effect.  Declines in labor income lead to a disproportionate decline in the 
household’s ability to purchase durable goods. This mechanism implies that hold-up 
  16problems become disproportionately more severe in times of low income, and vice versa. 
It is this link that breaks the one-to-one relationship above and will cause durable goods 
to be more volatile than labor income. 
  The hold-up constraint (6) has the flavor of US individual bankruptcy law. The 
bankruptcy law is designed to allow the individual to keep his or her house. The court 
orders an individual’s income net of living expenses to be seized in order to pay off the 
secured creditors. Living expenses likely contain a fixed “subsistence” level of income as 
well as one that varies with respect to the individual’s income. We have priced this fixed 
cost in units of time. 
With this hold-up constraint the household’s decision-making is now summarized 
by the following optimization conditions: 
           ( 7 )     t
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where t 1 λ  is the multiplier on the budget constraint and  t 2 λ  is the multiplier on the hold-
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The distortion acts as a tax on durable good purchases as durables are now more difficult 
to purchase because of the hold-up constraint.   
T 
  17he household’s employment choice can be expressed as  
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The labor condition is also affected by the hold-up constraint.  Since labor income relaxes 
the constraint, the distortion acts as a subsidy to employment.  This subsidy tends to 
encourage employment partially offsetting the tax on durable goods purchases, but since 
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Note first that since the durable good sector has flexible prices, the mark-up of prices 
over wages is invariant to monetary shocks. Second, equation (10) implies that   
will vary only slightly with shocks.  This is because the stock of durable goods will vary 
little with respect to shocks. A monetary contraction will thus have little effect on the first 
two terms on the right-hand side of (13).  However, it will tighten the credit constraint, 
ie., an increase in  .  Since μ < 1, this will cause a decline in the return to working and 
thus a decline in employment. Note that if μ = 1 labor does not respond to monetary 
shocks.   
) (t U rp c t
t m
The size of the fixed cost is also very important. Log-linearizing the hold-up 
constraint yields  
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Solving we have: 
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If fmc = 0 we have that durables and non-durables will move one for one. If fmc > 0, 
however, durable production must move more than non-durables. The fact that the 
relative price of durables falls with an increases in interest rates reinforces that effect. 
This illustrates the importance of the fixed cost. 
 
4.a. Calibration. 
For ease of comparison, we use the same calibration as in Section 2.  For 
example, the preference parameter b is again chosen to imply a steady-state with 82% 
non-durable consumption (sc = 0.82). Because of the credit constraint, this implies a 
lower value of b in comparison to the baseline model.   
As for the credit constraint parameters, we interpret the F in (6) as the cost of 
bankruptcy.  Estimates of these costs vary from 15% to 36%.  We consider two 
calibrations, F = 20% of household income, and F = 30% of household income. The size 
of μ is then chosen endogenously to match the 18% durable share in consumption:   
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Hence there is only one free parameter.  For F = 20% we have μ = 0.25; for F = 30% we 
have μ = 0.28. 
 
4.b. Results.  
For the case of F = 20%, Figure 4 exhibits the model economy’s behavior to a 
policy shock that causes the nominal interest rate to increase by 25 basis points (100 
annual basis points).  Price stickiness in the non-durable sector leads to a decline in non-
durable production of 0.93%.  The decline in labor income leads, via the credit constraint, 
to a decline in durable spending (-1.27%) and a sharp decline in the relative price of 
durables (-2.96%).  Total production falls by 1%.  All of these effects are protracted 
because the persistent interest rate change leads to a persistent decline in labor income.   
Figure 4 also presents sensitivity analysis on the key credit parameter F with the 
value of F = 30% reported.  Similarly, we report results in which there are housing 
adjustment costs, ES = 1.  The sensitivity results in Figure 4 are as anticipated: a higher 
FC magnifies the effects, while ES = 1 dampens the effects.   
 
  205. Conclusions. 
This paper has demonstrated two possible solutions to the co-movement puzzle.  
As a way of assessing the two solutions, we begin with a stylized review of the facts.  
Erceg and Levin’s (2005) VAR evidence suggests that a 100 basis point (annualized) 
monetary contraction is followed by a 0.27% decline in non-durables and a 2.7% decline 
in residential investment (a 10-1 ratio).  The responses are hump-shaped, with the peak 
response about four quarters out.  Erceg and Levin (2005) report only a small decline in 
the relative price of the composite durable-goods/residential-housing in the wake of the 
shock. 
Figure 4 reports the sticky wage model as well as the credit model for ease of 
comparison.  The sticky wage model (with ES = 1 and νw = 0.67) implies a peak decline 
of 0.81% in non-durables and 5.14% in housing in the wake of a 100 basis point 
monetary shock.  The relative price of durables falls by 1.27%.  The credit model (with 
ES = ∞ and FC = 20%) implies a peak decline of 0.98% in non-durables and 1.6% in 
durables in response to the 100 basic point contraction.  Relative prices fall much more 
sharply here, by 3.14%, as this is a demand-side story.  These figures suggest that the 
sticky wage story more successfully explains the co-movement puzzle, roughly matching 
the relative production volatilities in the data, and implying a modest decline in relative 
prices.  This assessment is reinforced by the predictions about the real wage.  The 
empirical evidence suggests very modest movements in real wages in the wake of a 
monetary shock.  The wage model is consistent with this evidence, but the credit model’s 
prediction on wage behavior seems counterfactual. 
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